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THE MADISONIAN THEORY OF RIGHTS
JACK N. RAKOVE*
In April 1988, I paid my first visit to the estate of James
Madison at Montpelier. The tour is far less elaborate than what
one sees at Mr. Jefferson's house at Monticello-and in this, as in
so many other things, our fourth president still lags a step or two
behind his friend and immediate predecessor. The van that takes
visitors from the mansion to the parking lot some distance away
swings by the family plot where Madison is buried. I was the only
passenger who took up the driver's invitation to view the grave;
but then I was the only Madison biographer on the bus, and it was
late in the afternoon. In any event, there was little to linger over.
The stone simply reads, "James Madison, 1751-1836." Once again,
I found it hard to ignore the contrast with another marker not so
far away, where Thomas Jefferson, by his own wish, is remembered
as the "Author of the Declaration of American Independence, of
the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and Father of the
University of Virginia."
Any epitaph written for Madison today would probably recall
him as the principal author of the Constitution of 1787, of The
Federalist, and of the constitutional amendments we know as the
Bill of Rights. Among these three achievements, Madison would
doubtless be most proud of the first and most surprised by the
great intellectual reputation he has gained from the second. But
perhaps he would be most puzzled by the enormous influence that
the Bill of Rights has acquired over modern American constitu-
tionalism. For, although Madison the founder was very much the
libertarian, he was highly skeptical of the value of bills of rights.
Indeed, in August 1789, at the height of the congressional debates
over his proposed amendments to the Constitution, he privately
described his efforts as a "nauseous project"'-though by this he
* Associate Professor of History, Stanford University. A.B., Haverford College, 1968;
Ph.D. Harvard University, 1975.
1. Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 346, 346 (1979).
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probably alluded to the feelings of his colleagues in Congress
rather than his own.
Among the members of the First Congress, Madison was almost
alone in believing that prompt action on amendments was a politi-
cal necessity. Nearly everyone else favored postponing the entire
subject until the new government was operating safely-by which
point, many congressmen hoped, the perceived need for a bill of
rights itself might have evaporated. Madison's insistence that Con-
gress act sooner, not later, insured the incorporation of a bill of
rights in the Constitution.
On balance, however, Madison's prior and subsisting doubts
about the value of bills of rights seem far more interesting than his
expedient reasons for proposing the amendments of 1789. He
based his position on this question on considerations far more sub-
stantial than the standard Federalist argument that a bill of rights
was unnecessary and even dangerous. Madison's reservations were
rooted instead in his fundamental criticism of what he called the
"Vices of the Political System of the United States"2 and in his
general theory of republican government-especially as that theory
coalesced during the late 1780s, the Madisonian moment of Ameri-
can constitutionalism. Recognizing, as a good originalist should,
that the intentions and understandings prevailing at the time of
the legal adoption of the Constitution should guide later interpre-
tations, I propose to pay particular attention to the conclusions
Madison drew during this crucial period. At the same time, as a
card-carrying historian concerned with describing change over
time, I want to identify the evolutionary elements in his thought,
and in doing so, to suggest something of the difficulty of trying to
isolate a pure or pristine Madisonian understanding of the prob-
lem of rights.'
By way of introduction, one can identify three critical proposi-
tions that lie at the heart of Madison's thinking about bills of
rights and the larger problem of the protection of individual and
minority rights:
2. Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, reprinted in 9 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON 345 (1975).
3. For a more general discussion of Madison's political thought in the late 1780s, see
Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 473 (1988).
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1. In a republic, claims of rights were to be asserted most. di-
rectly not against the coercive authority of the state per se, but
against the wishes and desires of interested popular majorities
who could, in effect, control the uses to which the legal power of
the state could be put.
2. Consistent with the arithmetical logic of his general theory
of faction, Madison believed that the greater dangers to individ-
ual and minority rights would continually arise within the
smaller compass of the states and local communities rather than
within the extended sphere of the national republic itself.4 Seen
in this way, the most Madisonian element of the Constitution is
arguably the fourteenth amendment, which was, of course,
adopted a full three decades after his death.
3. Madison's reservations about the dangers inherent in any
enumeration of rights rested on a profound perception of the
plasticity of legislative power. The enumeration of rights was
problematic because the delegation of specific powers was un-
likely to restrain lawmakers who knew how to exploit the sup-
pleness of legislative power itself.
I
As we all know, it is no easy matter to define exactly what we
mean by rights; but however open or complex our definitions, we
think of rights as durable claims that individuals and groups may
maintain against the political will of the community or the state.
Rights are permanent and inalienable. New rights may be created,
but old rights should never be abolished once their legitimacy is
accepted. Yet we also know from our own experience that our par-
ticular conceptions of rights, and our conceptions of particular
rights, vary all the time.
As it is today, so it was in the era of the American Revolution.
Ideas of rights figured powerfully in the political movements that
led to the writing of both the Declaration of Independence in 1776,
and the Constitution and Bill of Rights in 1787 and 1789 respec-
tively. Certain principled notions of rights and liberties remained
fixed throughout the period. Yet no one could possibly claim that
4. See Madison, supra note 2, at 353-57; Letter from James Madison to George Washing-
ton (Apr. 16, 1787), reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382, 383-84 (1975).
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the Revolutionaries' understanding of rights was static and un-
changing, or beyond the realm of political debate and heated con-
troversy. Like every other element in the matrix of American con-
stitutional thought, definitions of rights and notions of their
protection shifted with the progress of the republican project.'
No one illustrates better the dynamic and nuanced character of
American thinking about rights than James Madison. Precisely be-
cause Madison was such an original thinker, he may not be the
most representative figure to single out in an effort to reconstruct
the true "original understanding" of the Bill of Rights. As its prin-
cipal mover in 1789, however, his intentions and ideas deserve spe-
cial notice.
The evolution of Madison's thinking about the general problem
of rights took place in four stages, which I will block out before
going on to examine the distinctive elements of his general theory.
The first phase is the easiest to describe. It dates roughly from the
early 1770s, when Madison returned to Virginia from his collegiate
studies at Princeton, to 1785-86, when he played the crucial politi-
cal role in the defeat of the religious assessment bill and the subse-
quent passage of the celebrated Statute for Religious Freedom that
his friend Thomas Jefferson had drafted in 1779. This was the
Madison whose commitment to broad principles of religious liberty
predated the development of his interest in either politics or con-
stitutional theory. His first known comments on political issues of
any kind expressed his abhorrence of the persecution of Baptist
ministers for preaching without a license in pre-Revolutionary Vir-
ginia.' His early letters to his college friend William Bradford con-
tain several comparisons between the enlightened condition of reli-
gious liberty in Bradford's Pennsylvania and the benighted
situation in his own colony.7 Madison's first notable action in pub-
lic life was to secure an amendment to the Virginia Declaration of
Rights of 1776, altering an article that originally proposed allowing
5. The most important work on pre-Revolutionary conceptions of rights is J. REID, CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986). See
J. REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1988).
6. See Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Apr. 1, 1774), reprinted in 1
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 111-13 (1962).
7. See Letters from James Madison to William Bradford (Dec. 1, 1773, Jan. 24, 1774, and
Apr. 1, 1774), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 100, 104, 111 (1962).
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the "fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion" to a broader
recognition that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise
of religion, according to the dictates of conscience."'
Madison stated his own position on religious liberty most explic-
itly in his Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assess-
ments of 1785.1 Precisely because Madison strains to deploy every
argument he can against the idea of a general assessment, no one
reading the Memorial could conclude intelligently that its author
was anything but a strict separationist. Nothing sustains the claim
that Madison actually favored what we now call nonpreferentialist
support for religion in general. "Who does not see," he asked, "that
the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of
all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particu-
lar sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?"'
As much as the Memorial reveals about the depth of Madison's
unequivocal commitment to religious liberty, its treatment of the
general problem of rights offers a curious mixture of original and
conventional ideas. In its most explicitly political passages, the
Memorial casts the question of religious liberty in the familiar
terms of a struggle between overreaching rulers and a citizenry
that needs to be roused to protect its rights. The rights in question
belong to the ruled; the danger they face arises specifically from
the rulers. Madison thus uses much the same language that Revo-
lutionary leaders had directed against Parliament a decade earlier:
The Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment [on the
rights of the people], exceed the commission from which they
derive their authority, and are Tyrants. The People who submit
to it are governed by laws made neither by themselves nor by an
authority derived from them, and are slaves."
8. Madison, Declaration of Rights and Form of Government of Virginia, reprinted in 1
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 173, 175 (1962). The progress of dis-establishment in Vir-
ginia has been extensively studied. See T. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY
VIRGINIA, 1776-1787 (1977); THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION
AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (M. Peterson & R. Vaughan eds. 1988) (collected
essays).
9. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments (1785), re-
printed in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298 (1973).
10. Id. at 300.
11. Id. at 299-300.
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Thus wrote Madison in point two of the Memorial. The next point
made the appeal even more explicit. The general assessment
should be opposed, Madison continued,
[b]ecause it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on
our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty
of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of the late
Revolution. The free men of America did not wait till usurped
power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the
question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the
principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the
principle. 2
In his concluding point Madison returned to the greater danger
that would arise from a failure to check the rulers in this one in-
stance: If the rulers could violate this one right, why could they
not "sweep away all our fundamental rights" as well? 3 Samuel Ad-
ams could not have put the point any better in opposing the
Stamp Act or the Declaratory Act or any of the other parliamen-
tary measures that led to the Revolution.
If the rhetoric of rights sounds familiar, however, in other re-
spects Madison's position was not entirely conventional. The rulers
against whom these claims were to operate were no longer the po-
litically unaccountable members of Parliament or the agents of the
British crown; they were the elected representatives of the citizens
of Virginia. In the traditional view, they were the men who were
supposed to defend popular rights and liberties against the arbi-
trary claims of the other main branch of government-the execu-
tive. The novelty of the question Madison and others faced was to
understand how claims of rights could be maintained against the
political institution long regarded as the great bulwark of liberty.
Insofar as Madison could locate the assessment struggle within the
familiar rubric of rulers and ruled, however, his thought remained,
in a sense, conventional.' 4
The second phase in the evolution of Madison's thinking about
the problem of rights overlaps the first. By 1785, Madison was wor-
rying more and more about the problem of legislative misrule
12. Id. at 300.
13. Id. at 304.
14. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 268-73 (1969).
[Vol. 31:245
THE MADISONIAN THEORY OF RIGHTS
within the states. Indeed, his mounting concern with the character
of state legislation, state legislatures and state legislators was the
engine that drove the development of his constitutional thinking in
the mid-1780s. Much of his concern was a reaction to his experi-
ence in the Virginia Assembly in the mid-1780s. As Gordon Wood
has nicely put it, "Really for the first time, Madison found out
what democracy in America might mean.' 1 5 What it meant, he now
knew, was that "[n]ot all the legislators were going to be like him
or Jefferson; many of them did not even appear to be gentle-
men."'16 Repeatedly, his "parochial" colleagues in the Assembly
mangled or rejected the useful, enlightened bills that Madison
drafted or supported. "What could he do with such clods?" Wood
asks. 1
7
Madison's initial discontent centered more on general questions
of public policy than on matters of rights, and more on the failings
of legislators than on the shortcomings of their constituents. By
1785, however, he was clearly sensitive to the need to protect indi-
vidual rights against legislative abuse. In his August 1785 letter
discussing a constitution for Kentucky, Madison argued that
[t]he Constitution may expresly [sic] restrain [the legislature]
from medling [sic] with religion-from abolishing Juries[,] from
taking away the Habeus corpus-from forcing a citizen to give
evidence against himself, from controuling the' press, from en-
acting retrospective laws at least in criminal cases, from abridg-
ing the right of suffrage, from seizing private property for public
use without paying its full Valu[e,] from licensing the importa-
tion of Slaves, from infringing the Confederation.' s
Yet even this list of rights seems fairly conventional.
It was between August 1785 and March 1787 that Madison de-
veloped the two absolutely crucial elements defining his great goals
for the Federal Convention. The first derived from his conviction
that state laws were not simply poorly crafted or ill considered or
15. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 69, 74
(1987).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 350, 351 (1973).
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unwise on grounds of policy, but that they were unjust because
they violated fundamental private rights. The second component
that is also difficult to locate in Madison's thought before 1787 is
the recognition that the deeper sources of this injustice lay not in
the guile or ambition of legislators, but in their very responsiveness
to the wishes of their constituents.
The great moment of discovery came when Madison drafted his
remarkable memorandum Vices of the Political System of the
United States in April 1787.1' For it was here that he first recog-
nized that the "multiplicity," "mutability," and most importantly,
the "injustice" of the laws that the states had enacted since inde-
pendence, had called "into question the fundamental principle of
republican Government, that the majority who rule in such Gov-
ernments, are the safest Guardians both of public Good and of pri-
vate rights."20 In explaining why this was true, Madison developed
the central ideas of his constitutional theory and his new under-
standing of the problem of rights.
In 1787, Madison was still ready to blame the sorry condition of
public affairs on the characters of state legislators. All too often
they sought office only for motives of "ambition" and "personal
interest," rather than from sincere considerations of "public good."
But the greater danger arose, he now concluded, not from the leg-
islators themselves, but from their constituents. "A still more fatal
if not more frequent cause" of unjust legislation, he wrote, "lies
among the people themselves."'" Madison designed his famous the-
ory of faction to explain why this was so.
For all the midrashic commentary this theory has evoked, its
central points are readily stated. First, factions are inevitable in
"[a]ll civilized societies" because the diversity of interests and the
fallibility of human reason and passions generate endless sources
of division.2 Second, a republic's peculiar danger is that
"[w]henever... an apparent interest or common passion unites a
majority," few effective checks exist to "restrain them from unjust
violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individ-
19. Madison, supra note 2, at 354.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 355.
22. Id.
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uals. ' '1 3 Third, because the ease with which such factious majorities
form varies inversely with the size of a society, a national republic
will be more resistant to the mischiefs of faction than the existing
states of the American union.24 Fourth, because much of the bur-
den of governance will continue to rest with the states, however,
individual and minority rights will remain exposed to violation by
state legislatures and the majorities they represent.25 The only ade-
quate solution to this problem, Madison believed, was to give the
reconstituted national government an absolute veto over all state
laws. The national government would serve as a "disinterested &
dispassionate umpire in disputes between different passions & in-
terests in the State"-that is, within the individual states-and
curb "the aggressions of interested majorities on the rights of mi-
norities and of individuals."26 The proposed national veto on state
laws was thus the central innovation of Madison's entire scheme of
reform. This, rather than the adoption of a comprehensive bill of
rights, was the measure that Madison regarded as indispensable to
the preservation of civil liberty in America.
Madison's new understanding of rights was also clearly based on
his growing fear that fundamental rights of property were becom-
ing increasingly vulnerable to abuse by legislators spurred on by
the factious majorities they represented.28 By 1787, the need to
protect property had become almost an obsession for Madison, and
this concern carried his thought far beyond his longstanding com-
mitment to religious liberty and the more conventional civil liber-
ties of the Anglo-American tradition. The force of this attachment
to the rights of property alone explains just how radical, or reac-
tionary, his thought had become.
The rejection of the veto so gravely disappointed Madison that
he left Philadelphia in September 1787, fearful that the Constitu-
tion would "neither effectually answer its national object nor pre-
23. Id.
24. See id. at 356-57.
25. See id.
26. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), reprinted in 9
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382, 384 (1975).
27. On this point, see Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Consti-
tution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 215 (1979).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 51-58.
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vent the local mischiefs which every where excite disgusts
ag[ain]st the state governments."2 9 The third stage of his thinking
about the problem of rights dates from the adjournment of the
Convention to Madison's successful campaign to push the Bill of
Rights through the First Federal Congress in 1789. Its significance
rests on Madison's efforts to balance intellectual consistency with
his perception of the public discussions of the Constitutiofi. Far
from abandoning the conclusions he had drawn during the months
before the Convention, Madison remained convinced that his rea-
sons for dismissing bills of rights as useless "parchment barriers""0
were still sound. Yet from his intense involvement in the ratifica-
tion campaign of 1787-88 and the first federal elections that fol-
lowed, he also came to recognize that public opinion demanded the
addition of some amendments to the new Constitution."
Just how little had changed in Madison's private thinking about
rights is evident from two remarkable letters he sent to Jefferson
on the subject. Written a year apart, the letters are entirely consis-
tent with the analysis and conclusions he had drawn in his prepa-
rations for the Federal Convention. Madison's defense of his pro-
posed absolute veto on state laws in the first letter cannot be
dismissed as a reflective rationalization of an idea whose impracti-
cality he ncw recognized. It was instead a spirited defense of a
measure whose rejection would leave the new government under
the Constitution unable either to defend itself against the interfer-
ence of the states or to protect individual and minority rights
against unjust state legislation.2
Equally important, Madison still believed that the worst threats
to liberty would arise "not from acts of Government contrary to
the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Govern-
ment is the mere instrument of the major number of the constitu-
29. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), reprinted in 10 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 163, 163-64 (1977).
30. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 297 (1977).
31. See Editorial Note, Madison's Election to the First Federal Congress Oct. 1788 - Feb.
1789, reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 301, 302 (1977).
32. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 10 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 206 (1977).
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ents." 33 The popular character of these majorities was the crucial
factor that led Madison to dismiss bills of rights as mere "parch-
ment barriers." Why would a majority bent on injustice be dis-
suaded from its evil purposes by the mere existence of a bill of
rights? Madison's analysis of the sources of faction and the nature
of public opinion was bent toward demonstrating why rational ap-
peals to higher principles would prove unavailing. In a monarchy,
the existence of a bill of rights might serve as "a signal for rousing
& uniting the superior force of the community" 4 against tyranni-
cal acts of government; but in a republic "the political and physical
power" 35 of government rested with the people at large, and a bill
of rights could hardly work to rouse the community against itself.
These comments appeared, however, in the same letter in which
Madison informed Jefferson that he would be willing to accept the
addition of a bill of rights to the Constitution.3 6 Madison soon
publicly affirmed this position during his contest with James
Monroe for a seat in the House of Representatives.3 7 Explaining
this shift as a "campaign conversion" is easy enough.38 Yet
Madison had a more principled basis for his reluctant acceptance
of the need for amendments. A bill of rights might be useful,
Madison conceded, if "[t]he political truths declared in that sol-
emn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental max-
ims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the
national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and
passion.'39
The experience of the ratification campaign itself probably made
this educative aspect of bills of rights more appealing to Madison
33. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 30, at 298.
34. Id.
35. Id. This opinion tracks his earlier explanation in THE FEDERALIST No. 49 of the rea-
sons why appeals to public opinion could not provide an effective remedy against the abuse
of legislative power.
36. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 30, at 297.
37. Editorial Note, supra note 31, at 302-03.
38. As Robert Morris put the point in 1789, when Madison was struggling to get Congress
to consider his amendments, he "got frightened in Virginia and 'wrote a Book.'" Madison
issued public letters announcing his revised views. Letter from Robert Morris to James Wil-
son (Aug. 23, 1789) (Willing, Morris, and Swanwick Papers, Pennsylvania Historical and
Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pa.).
39. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 30, at 298-99.
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in 1788 than earlier. The popular clamor for amendments indi-
cated, perhaps, that public opinion was less "vicious" or misguided
than Madison imagined. A bill of rights framed in response to pop-
ular demands would acquire more authority precisely because of
the exceptional political circumstances under which it was
adopted. To future generations, it would provide evidence of how
deeply Americans had cared about preserving rights at the great
moment of the Constitution's adoption. When Madison prodded a
reluctant Congress in 1789 to take up his amendments, he took
care to explain that he was responding, first and foremost, to the
legitimate call of public opinion.40
When Madison first informed Jefferson of his willingness to ac-
cept a bill of rights, he added one other reason to justify his change
of heart. "Altho' it be generally true ... that the danger of oppres-
sion lies in the interested majorities of the people rather than in
the usurped acts of the Government," he noted, "yet there may be
occasions on which the evil may spring from the latter sources; and
on such, a bill of rights would be a good ground for an appeal to
the sense of the community. 41 He did not think this was a likely
scenario, but he could not rule out the possibility that a govern-
ment insulated from popular control might abuse liberty, even in a
republic.
Madison came to accept the real force of this danger during the
fourth phase in the evolution of his thinking about the problem of
rights. This phase can be dated to the decade of the 1790s-the
period after the first ten amendments were framed and ratified. As
Madison and Jefferson began to oppose the programs of Alexander
Hamilton, they regarded the ruling Federalist party not as the in-
strument of a true popular majority, but as a quasi-aristocratic
clique that had gained control of the national government. Confi-
dence in their belief that a popular majority would eventually rally
to their own Republican standard sustained the two Virginians
through the repeated political reverses they suffered in the 1790s.
By the end of the decade, however, Madison realized that Jefferson
had been right all along to insist that "a bill of rights is what the
people are entitled to against every government on earth, general
40. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 427-28 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (speech by Madison before Congress).
41. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 30, at 299.
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or particular."42 For in the opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798,
the first amendment did provide "a good ground for an appeal to
the sense of the community" against "usurped acts of the Govern-
ment. '43 At the same time, Madison also recognized that dangers
to liberty could arise as easily at the national level of government
as at the state level.
II
If nothing else, this brief effort to trace the evolution of
Madison's thinking about rights should illustrate the difficulty, if
not the absurdity, of attempting to freeze a moment of historical
time as the point when he possessed a true original understanding
of exactly how the Constitution was to protect rights. The general
problem of rights concerned Madison continuously, but his ideas of
which rights most needed protection, and how they were to be pro-
tected, varied over time. Certain recurring concerns and insights,
however, gave the Madisonian theory of liberty its power and bril-
liance, and remain instructive today.
To some extent, Madison did accept the clever arguments
against a bill of rights that James Wilson offered in a widely re-
ported public speech in Philadelphia, delivered only three weeks
after the adjournment of the Constitutional Convention. The ex-
plicit reservation of certain rights in the Constitution, Wilson de-
clared, "would have been superfluous and absurd" because the new
government had not been given the power to regulate the various
activities that most deserved protection. 44 Madison further ac-
cepted the basic Federalist argument that the positive declaration
of certain rights might relegate to inferior status other rights left
unmentioned but equally valuable. He was also aware that any at-
tempt to reduce a general right to a specific textual formula could
prove self-defeating if, for political reasons, "a positive declaration
of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the
42. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 10 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 335, 337 (1977).
43. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 30, at 299.
44. Speech by James Wilson before Public Meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania State
Courthouse Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
CATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 339, 339-40 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 1981).
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requisite latitude."' 5 The very act of reducing a conception of one
right or another to any specific form might limit rather than ex-
pand the basis for its protection. Better, in other words, not to
have any bill of rights than to incorporate in the Constitution weak
textual statements that might leave room for the violation of liber-
ties the bill of rights was meant to protect.
Yet, as Jefferson argued, "Half a loaf is better than no bread. If
we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure what we can."46 This
was the sensible objection Madison remained reluctant to accept.
The problem was not that he was incapable of enumerating a
whole range of rights; he could have done so readily at the dip of a
quill, and had done so in a 1785 letter concerning a constitution for
Kentucky, for example.47 He had no problem recognizing the bene-
fits of an outright prohibition of legislative power over matters of
religion. Nor would he have found it difficult to codify the essential
civil and political liberties necessary to protect the citizen against
the coercive power of the state. And indeed, as Leonard Levy has
noted, in 1789 Madison sought to incorporate expansive notions of
rights into the provisions that became the fourth amendment's
protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and the
fifth amendment's protection from self-incrimination.4"
Madison's opposition to the enumeration of rights rested on a
more profound and complex set of considerations. At the heart of
his thought lay two overarching concerns. One involved his sub-
stantial fears about the security of property; the other involved his
analysis of the nature of legislative power itself.
The best way to develop these points may be to examine the
relation between Madison's views of religious liberty and the near
obsession with property rights that affected him so strongly in
1787. We know that Madison's appreciation of the liberty-preserv-
ing benefits of diverse economic interests owed a great deal to his
grasp of the way in which multi-denominationalism fostered reli-
gious liberty. He said as much in a famous passage in The Federal-
ist No. 51:
45. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 30, at 297.
46. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 13, 14 (1979).
47. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace, supra note 18, at 352-56.
48. L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 242-45, 247-49 (1988).
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In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the
same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in
the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity
of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the
number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to de-
pend on the extent of country and number of people compre-
hended under the same government.49
Diversity begets jealousy, and jealousy begets security. This was a
lesson Madison drew from experience as well as observation and
reflection. In the struggle over the religious assessment bill of 1784-
85, Madison and his allies had appealed to the mutual jealousies of
the various sects of Protestant Virginia. Even though those sects
arguably had a common interest in the bill, which would have sup-
ported all teachers of Christianity, its opponents managed to par-
lay their diverse opinions and their fear that one or more denomi-
nations might benefit excessively into a final decision validating an
essential principle of liberty.50 Had the denominational map of
Virginia looked less complex, the bill probably would have passed.
In at least two other respects, however, the differences between
the case of religious liberty in 1785 and the issues that Madison
sought to resolve in 1787 are as striking as the similarities. First,
the apparent lesson that Madison could have drawn from the de-
feat of the assessment bill in 1785 was exactly the lesson he re-
jected in 1787. In 1785, Madison could have concluded that ap-
peals to public opinion could work in a liberty-preserving way. His
Memorial, after all, was not a mere tract espousing religious lib-
erty, but an actual petition designed to sway the votes of popularly
elected legislators. That appeal, coupled with other petitions that
garnered even more support, had worked, successfully mobilizing
public opinion in Virginia in behalf of liberty.
Far more important, however, was the fundamental difference
between issues of religious liberty and other areas of governance in
which Madison feared that factious majorities stood ready to tram-
ple individual and minority rights. At the core of Madison's sup-
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
476, 478-79 (1977).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
263, 265-66 (1977).
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port for free exercise and dis-establishment lay the radical convic-
tion that the entire sphere of religious practice could be, in a word,
deregulated. In this one area, at least, Madison and Jefferson were
the Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman-dare one say the
Richard Epstein?-of their day. They believed not only that reli-
gious conviction and practice were private matters, but also that
religion, like capitalism, flourished best when unregulated.
Because religion could be seen as a matter of opinion only, it
marked the one area of traditional governance in which a flat con-
stitutional denial of legislative jurisdiction seemed able to enlarge
the realm of private rights. No such clarity emerged, however,
when the Madison of 1787 turned to the other area in which he
feared that private rights were most vulnerable to violation. When
rights of property were at stake, Madison believed, neither the pos-
itive and specific delegation of legislative power, nor its explicit de-
nial and limitation would prove adequate. The clearest statement
of his reasoning on this point is in The Federalist No. 10, in the
paragraph that follows the description of the sources of faction. It
deserves careful explication.
After noting how different forms of property divided society into
different "interests," Madison closed his account of "[tihe latent
causes of faction" with this observation: "The regulation of these
various and interfering interests forms the principal task of mod-
ern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the
necessary and ordinary operations of government."'" But Madison
then proceeded to challenge the very idea that acts of economic
regulation are truly legislative in character. "[W]hat are many of
the most important acts of legislation," he asked, "but so many
judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single
persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens; and
what-are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and par-
ties to the causes which they determine?"52
Madison's examples of such "determinations" reveal how much
he regarded decisions of economic policy as implicating questions
of private rights. Laws relating to creditors and debtors, to the
protection of domestic manufactures and the restriction of foreign
51. Id. at 266.
52. Id.
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goods, and to the apportionment of taxes all involve questions of
justice, and thus of rights.53 In contrast to the modern cry against
judges acting as legislators, Madison suggested that legislators in-
evitably act as judges, without needing, however, to maintain a
pretense of judicial impartiality. Economic rights, then, were fun-
damentally different from rights of conscience in this one critical
sense: Government could safely abstain from regulating matters
of religion, but it could never avoid having to regulate the "various
and interfering interests" of which modern societies were
composed.
The new and creative elements in Madison's understanding of
the problem of rights were thus rooted in his mounting concern
about the security of property. To reduce Madison's notions of
rights to economic questions alone would, of course, be wrong. Yet
clearly the Madison of 1787 was intensely worried that populist
forces in the states might pass all kinds of laws endangering prop-
erty rights.
That concern was not entirely original in 1787. In 1785, for ex-
ample, Madison endorsed the idea that the electors of the upper
house in the states should be limited to those holding a significant,
though unspecified, amount of property. 4 Events since 1785 made
this somewhat abstract concern more urgent. Paper money laws,
debtor stay laws, and Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts all
alarmed him terribly. So did the grim prospect that he sketched at
the Federal Convention. Even in the United States, he warned, a
factious majority might eventually form, made up "of those who
will labour under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a
more equal distribution of its blessings. ' 5 The constitution writers
of 1776, Madison believed, had erred in assuming that by protect-
ing "the rights of persons" they would also protect "those of prop-
erty."56 Now he understood "that in all populous countries"-the
United States not excepted-"the smaller part [of society] only
53. Id.
54. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace, supra note 18, at 353.
55. Speech by James Madison before the Federal Convention in Philadelphia (June 26,
1787), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 76, 77 (1977).
56. Madison, Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (Oct. 15,
1788), reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 285, 287-88 (1977).
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can be interested in preserving the rights of property."57 Efforts to
protect the rights of property had to be made now, while "the bulk
of the people" were still attached to the rights of persons and
property alike.58
These comments belie the optimistic forecast we associate with
The Federalist Nos. 10 and 51. Madison could be fairly certain
that Protestant sectarianism would remain a constant in American
life, protecting religious liberty through its fruitful multiplication
of irresolvable opinions on theology, ecclesiology and forms of wor-
ship. Indeed, nothing better illustrated the way in which mere
opinion could generate division within a community, even when its
members shared other interests. He was less confident, however,
that economic change would produce divisions equally complex.
True, an extended republic would prevent or discourage the wrong
kinds of majorities from forming at the national level of govern-
ment, but the catch lay in the residual power that the states would
necessarily exercise over the economy. Even in his most expansive
moments, Madison never pretended that a reconstituted national
government could superintend the daily affairs of the entire union.
Most legislation affecting property would continue to be enacted at
the state level.
Moreover, according to the arithmetical logic of his theory of
faction, the creation of an extended national republic would not
prevent the continued formation of factious majorities within the
individual states, which was why the entire Madisonian scheme of
1787 required the national veto on state laws. Madison may have
hoped that a reformed national Congress would set examples of
sound lawmaking that even the "clods" in the state assemblies
could learn to imitate. Even then, however, his perception of the
populist character of state politics did not encourage him to con-
clude that state legislators would prove suddenly resistant to the
"vicious" impulses of their constituents. The factious majorities
that he feared would continue to coalesce in the states were popu-
lar majorities, not simple coalitions of sleazy legislators.
57. Id.
58. Id. Madison thus well illustrates Gordon Wood's description of the transformation of
property as a Lockean right pertaining to all men into a peculiar interest deserving protec-
tion. See G. WOOD, supra note 14, at 214-22.
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Madison's doubts about the wisdom of enumeration had another
and more profound source. Legislators themselves were no longer
the sole or chief defendants in Madison's indictment of the politi-
cal sources of faction. Instead, his analysis of the constitutional
problem of rights placed great emphasis on the nature of legisla-
tion-especially on what he later called its "plastic faculty. '5 9 He
put the point most directly in his letter to Jefferson of October 24,
1787,60 but in striking ways it recurs elsewhere in his writings. In
defending his proposed national veto, Madison called attention to
the supple and amorphous character of legislative power. He
spoke, for example, of "the impossibility of dividing powers of leg-
islation, in such a manner, as to be free from different construc-
tions by different interests, or even from ambiguity in the judg-
ment of the impartial. '61 Close off one avenue of legislative excess,
and an artful legislature would only slip down another alley to do
its insidious work. This was why the "partial provision[s]" the
Constitution offered for the protection of economic rights through
the contract clause and the prohibition against state emission of
paper money would prove inadequate. "Supposing them to be ef-
fectual as far as they go, they are short of the mark. Injustice may
be effected by such an infinitude of legislative expedients, that
where the disposition exists it can only be controuled by some pro-
vision which reaches all cases whatsoever."62 This was why the veto
had to be unlimited.63
In the realm of economic legislation, then, Madison doubted that
any enumeration of legislative powers would work. The interests to
be regulated were so complex, and the ends and means of legisla-
tion so intertwined, that no simple formula seemed likely to defeat
a legislative ingenuity spurred on by the passions and interests of
popular majorities. Nor could one rely safely on the good offices of
59. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), reprinted in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 58 (1910).
60. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 32, at 211.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 212.
63. That is also why the Madison of the 1790s must have told himself a thousand times
that he should have paid more attention to the "necessary and proper" clause, whose broad
interpretation by Alexander Hamilton proved how right Madison had been only a few years
earlier. See Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to, Establish a Bank
(Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63, 101-07 (1965).
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the executive and judiciary to counteract the improper impulses of
the dominant branch. By its very rulemaking powers, the legisla-
ture could circumscribe the best efforts of the two weaker branches
of government to correct the injustices of legislation. The legisla-
ture could always "mask under complicated and indirect measures,
the encroachments which it makes, on the co-ordinate depart-
ments," '64 Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 48. "It is not un-
frequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether
the operation of a particular measure, will, or will not extend be-
yond the legislative sphere," 65 he said.
As Jefferson was quick to note, Madison seemed to ignore the
possibility that a bill of rights might actually provide an indepen-
dent judiciary with a "legal check" against improper acts of legisla-
tion.6 6 Madison had reached exactly the opposite conclusion. An
enumeration of rights, he feared, would prove far more effective in
limiting the judicial protection of rights than an enumeration of
legislative powers would in preventing their violation.
Madison's resistance to the enumeration of rights was thus
merely the opposite side of his fear that legislative power could
never be confined. The enumeration of rights, in other words,
might prove restrictive in a way or to an extent that the enumera-
tion of legislative powers could not. He believed it better to give
the two weaker branches something of the free play that the domi-
nant lawmaking branch could enjoy by manipulating its "infini-
tude of legislative expedients. ' ' S7 If many legislative decisions were
truly judicial in nature, Madison reasoned, why not bring the judi-
ciary into the legislative process so that judicial advice could hope-
fully prevent the legislature from committing its unjust mischief in
the first place? This was the point of Madison's other great pro-
posed innovation of 1787: the.joint executive-judicial council of re-
vision, which would be charged with the duty of advising Congress
of the merits of legislation before it was enacted, and which could
back up its advice by wielding a limited veto. The fact that the
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
456, 457 (1977).
65. Id.
66. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 13 (1979).
67. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 32, at 212.
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Philadelphia Convention found this proposal no more acceptable
than the absolute veto on state laws did not shake Madison's belief
in its essential value. As late as October 1788, in commenting on
Jefferson's draft of a constitution for Virginia, he modified his
views only to suggest that bills should "be separately communi-
cated to the Exec[utive] & Judic[iar]y depts." before their
enactment.6 8
One can thus make the case that James Madison's thinking
about rights in the late 1780s fused radical and reactionary ele-
ments. What other conclusion can we reach when we move beyond
the familiar formulas of The Federalist No. 10 to map the larger
contours of his thought? Here was a man who thought that virtu-
ally all matters of religion could be put safely beyond the reach of
the state, yet who also thought that all questions of economic regu-
lation involved questions of rights; who was prepared to argue that
because many legislative acts were really judicial in nature, the ju-
diciary might just as well be involved in the business of legislation;
who felt that the only reliable security for rights lay in giving an
insulated national government an absolute veto over the acts of the
officials most directly accountable to the people, their representa-
tives in the state legislatures. Yet as acute and powerful as
Madison's positions were, many of them were only posi-
tions-points that he was prepared to reinforce, modify or even
abandon as he continued to revolve the problem of rights in the
light of experience and events.
Among all the problems of rights that he had to consider, none
seemed more ominous or less tractable than the single form of op-
pression that Madison had observed most closely. He was frank to
include "the case of Black slaves in Modern times" as a potent
example of "[t]he danger of oppression to the minority from unjust
combinations of the majority." '69 At the Federal Convention, he
had noted that "the mere distinction of colour has been made.., a
ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man
over man."70 Yet for all his virtues, which were many, Madison was
68. Madison, supra note 56, at 292-93.
69. Madison, Notes for the National Gazette Essays, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 157, 160 (1983).
70. Speech by James Madison before Federal Convention in Philadelphia (June 6, 1787),
reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 32, 33 (1977).
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no better prepared to imagine a solution for the problem of slavery
than were any of his contemporaries. In his own way, he was part
of the problem. Madison defended the republican guarantee clause
in part because it would allow the national government to aid in
the suppression of slave rebellions, and the three-fifths clause be-
cause the ownership of slaves was a peculiar form of property right
that deserved special protection. 1
One Madisonian puzzle yet remains. I have argued that the un-
limited national veto on state laws was the crucial proposal for the
protection of rights that Madison favored in 1787 and 1788. Could
he seriously imagine that his own constituents would ever accept
such a proposal once they understood that its reach would extend
to the regulation of slavery? Or did he somehow hope that the veto
would provide an entering wedge with which the national govern-
ment might work to weaken the hold of slavery and all of its evil
effects? If he at least glimpsed the latter possibility, can we not
conclude that the Civil War amendments, especially the four-
teenth, are the most Madisonian elements of our Constitution?
So I like to think; but nothing better exposes the limits of
Madison's analysis of the problem of rights, and the reasons why
we must assess his thought critically, than his inability to articu-
late-or perhaps even perceive-the conclusions to which his pro-
posals led.
71. Madison's thoughts about slavery, especially during his long period of retirement after
1817, are the subject of poignant analysis in D. McCoy, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES
MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY (1989).
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